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JURISDICTION 
Appellant asserts jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5, 
Utah Constitution, and 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended)• 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case involves claims by both Okland Construction Company, 
Inc. ("Okland") and A.J. Mackay Company ("Mackay") against each 
other relative to a public highway construction project. Mackayfs 
appeal is from an Order of the District Court granting Okland!s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing Mackay's Complaint 
and denying Mackay's Motion for Summary Judgment to compel 
arbitration and to dismiss Okland's Counterclaims. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Was Mackay's Complaint Properly Dismissed for Failure to 
Comply with the Notice Requirements and Provisions of the 
Subcontracts with Okland ? 
2. Was Mackayfs Complaint Properly Dismissed for Failure to 
Allege that Mackay was Properly Licensed as a Contractor When the 
Contracts Were Entered Into and When the Claims Arose as Required 
by the Utah Contractors Licensing Act ? 
3. Was Mackayfs Complaint Properly Dismissed Based Upon 
Mackay1s Failure to Obtain a Contractors License as Required by 
the Utah Contractors Licensing Act ? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC, 
The following statutes and regulations are determinative of 
the issues on appeal and are set forth below pursuant to Rule 
24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 58-50-11 (1953 as amended)1: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain 
any action in any Court of the State for collection of 
compensation for the performance of any act for which a 
license is required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when 
the contract sued upon was entered into and when the 
alleged cause of action arose. 
Section 107(c), Rules and Regulations of the Utah Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing; 
Creation of a corporation creates a new legal person 
which requires a new license even though one or more 
stockholders have a contractor's license. A license held 
by a stockholder cannot be authority to the corporation 
to engage in contracting. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mackay's Statement of the Case contains numerous factual 
statements which are inaccurate and without any reference to the 
record or source of admissible evidence and which are unsupported 
1
 This provision was first enacted in 1981 and has since been 
included under various versions of the Utah Contractors Licensing 
Act since that time. It has been known as 58A-la-13; 58-50-11; and 
currently as 58-55-17. When this action was filed in December of 
1988, the provision was known as Section 58-50-11 and, therefore, 
will be referred in this brief under that designation. 
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by the record. All such allegations, therefore, should be 
disregarded by the Court. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. . 
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); Dirks v. Cornwell. 754 P.2d 946 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves contracts between Okland and Mackay on a 
public highway construction project known as Utah Department of 
Transportation project Number 1-215-9(72)10, West of Little 
Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East (the "Project") . Okland was 
the general contractor on the Project under contract with the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). Okland entered into 
subcontracts with Mackay for certain portions of the work. 
Subsequent to completion of the Project, Mackay submitted 
claims through Okland to UDOT for "extras" and, over a period of 
several years, participated in negotiations with UDOT concerning 
such claims. (R. 99-100; Mackay Brief, p. 3). At the time of 
completion of the project, Okland paid to Mackay all retention 
funds and amounts due and did not withhold any amounts from Mackay 
under its agreements on the Project. (R. 100). Mackayfs claims 
involve alleged "extra" work due to site conditions differing from 
the plans and specifications prepared by UDOT. (R. 100). Mackay 
did not notify Okland of any claims not passing through to UDOT 
3 
until this action was filed four years after the project was 
finished. (R. 101). 
Additionally, UDOT has withheld from Okland from Okland as 
liquidated damages on the Project, $48,600 due to the failure of 
Mackay to timely complete its work. Okland's Counterclaim against 
Mackay seeks recovery of the amounts withheld by UDOT from Okland 
as a result of Mackay's failure to prosecute the work in a diligent 
and workmanlike manner. (R. 9-16). 
Okland has sought, for over four years, the cooperation of 
Mackay in pursuing Mackay's claims against UDOT. (R. 100). The 
negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland, however, have not 
been concluded because Okland and UDOT are waiting for 
documentation and responses regarding UDOT concerns regarding 
Mackay's claims, including primarily concerns that Mackay failed 
to adequately man and equip its work forces and to perform the work 
in an efficient manner. (R. 99-101). Mackay has not provided any 
response or documentation regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland 
concerning Mackay's claims despite repeated requests over a period 
of more than four years. (R. 99-100). 
Mackay subsequently sought to arbitrate the subject claims but 
Okland refused because UDOT, as the party liable for such claims, 
was an indispensable party and UDOT refused to submit to 
arbitration. (R. 2, 99). On December 23, 1988, Mackay filed this 
4 
action seeking arbitration and "payment for certain work performed 
by Plaintiff..." (R. 2; Mackay's Brief, page 6, paragraph 13). 
On January 13, 1989, Okland filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
against Mackay seeking damages resulting from, without limitation, 
Mackay's negligence in performing the work and failure to prosecute 
the work in a prompt and diligent manner. (R. 9-16). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court 
On January 26, 1989, Okland filed its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Mackay's Complaint for 
failure to comply with the Contractors Licensing Act and for 
failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to suit. (R. 
17-18). Mackay subsequently filed its Motion to Dismiss the 
Counterclaim of Okland on January 30, 1989. (R. 45). On February 
7, 1989, Mackay filed another Motion for Summary Judgment to Compel 
Arbitration. (R. 52-53). All of these Motions were heard in the 
District Court on March 13, 1989, after numerous memoranda and 
filings by the parties. (R. 139). On March 29, 1989, the District 
Court entered its Order granting Okland's Motion dismissing 
Mackay's Complaint. The Order denied Mackay's Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Compel Arbitration and Motion to Dismiss Okland's 
Counterclaims. (R. 139-40). 
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On April 26, 1989, Mackay filed its Notice of Appeal from the 
Order entered by the District Court on March 29, 1989, which 
dismissed the Complaint and denied Mackay's motions regarding 
Okland's Counterclaim. (R. 148). 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Facts Presented to District Court 
1. On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay 
Company ("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract 
agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah 
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West of 
Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East. (R. 2, 36). 
2. On or about December 23, 1988, Mackay filed its Complaint 
seeking arbitration and for payment for certain extra work 
allegedly performed by plaintiff beyond the scope of the above 
agreements. (R. 2, 36; Mackay Brief, p. 6, paragraph 13, p. 8). 
3. The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the 
following provisions relative to Mackay's claims concerning 
Okland's performance: 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance 
of any work under this contract depend wholly or 
partially upon the proper workmanlike or accurate 
performance of any work or materials furnished by the 
Contractor or other subcontractors on the project, the 
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to 
discover any such defects and report the same in writing 
to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which 
is so dependant; and shall allow to the Contractor a 
reasonable time in which to remedy such defects; and in 
6 
the event he does not so report to the Contractor in 
writing, then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor 
has fully accepted the work of others as being 
satisfactory... 
(R. 30-32)(Emphasis Added). 
4. The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the 
following provision requiring timely written notice claims for 
extra work: 
...any changes made in the amount of work involved, or 
any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written 
amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes 
involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually 
agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor 
if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not 
possible, then the value of the work shall be determined 
as provided in Section 7 of this agreement. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional 
work outside the scope of this contract unless terms 
hereof shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement 
between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall 
be made within one week from date of completion. 
(R. 30-32). 
5. Mackay did not provide any written notice of alleged 
deficiencies in Okland^ work impacting the work of Mackay and did 
not give written notice of additional or extra work within one week 
of completion of the work. No written addendum to the agreements 
exist relative to the claims of Mackay. (R. 38, 100). 
6. The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that A.J. Mackay 
Company was licenced as a contractor in the State of Utah when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of 
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action arose. (R. 2-5). 
7. A. J. Mackay Company was not licensed as a contractor 
within the State of Utah when the contract sued upon was entered 
into and when the alleged cause of action arose. (R. 40) 
8. The subcontracts upon which Mackay sues were entered into 
on February 1, 1984, and the work thereunder was completed in 
November of 1984. (R. 36, 98). Mackay was not licensed as a 
contractor until May 1, 1985. (R. 40). 
9. Okland has paid to Mackay all retention funds and amounts 
due and has not withheld any amounts from Mackay under its 
agreements on the Project. (R. 100). 
10. Mackay submitted claims, after completion of the project, 
to UDOT for "extras" through Okland and, over a period of several 
years, participated in negotiations with UDOT concerning such 
claims. (R. 99-100; Mackay Brief, p. 3). 
11. All claims of Mackay against Okland are based upon acts 
of the Utah State Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), and not 
of Okland, and all such claims pass through to UDOT and would be 
the subject of third-party claims by Okland against UDOT. (R. 37) . 
12. UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated 
damages on the Project due to failure of Mackay to timely complete 
its work. Okland!s Counterclaim against Mackay seeks recovery of 
the amounts withheld by UDOT from Okland as a result of Mackay fs 
8 
failure to prosecute the work in a diligent and workmanlike manner. 
(R. 9-16). 
Response to Mackay's Statement of Facts 
Mackay sets forth in its Statement of Facts, and throughout 
its Brief, numerous alleged facts without any reference to the 
record or any source of admissible evidence as required by Rule 
24(e) of this Court. All such allegations, therefore, should be 
disregarded by the Court. Uckerman v. Lincoln Natfl Life Ins. Co., 
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). Additionally, a significant number of 
Mackay's Statement of Facts are not found at all in the record, or 
are otherwise inaccurate. 
1. Mackay inaccurately suggests, throughout its Statement of 
Facts, particularly paragraphs 1 through 10, that it was properly 
licensed when the subject contracts were entered into and during 
the Project. The contracts were entered into on February 1, 1984 
and all work on the Project was completed by November of 1984. (R. 
36, 98). The certificate from the Utah State Division of 
Professional Licensing confirms that plaintiff A.J. Mackay Company 
was not licensed until May 31, 1985. (R. 40). 
Mackay contends that a partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons, was 
formed sometime in 1979 and that at some later date the partnership 
was replaced with a corporation, A. J. Mackay Company, the 
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plaintiff in this action, and further, that failure of A. J, Mackay 
Company to obtain a license until 1985 was a mere oversight. The 
partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons was formed sometime in 1979. (R. 
50). The corporation, A.J. Mackay Company, was also incorporated 
on February 1, 1979. (R. 97). However, the plaintiff corporation, 
A.J. Mackay Company, did not obtain a contractors license until six 
years after incorporation. (R. 40, 50). Mackay's assertion not 
only ignores the undisputed facts in this matter, but also ignores 
the legal distinction between partnerships and corporations as 
separate and independent entities, which is discussed in the 
Argument below. 
2. Mackay's assertion in paragraph 2 of its Statement of 
Facts, that the corporation A.J. Mackay Company operated with the 
same personnel as the partnership A.J. Mackay & Sons is unsupported 
by the record. Mackay refers to pages 50 and 111 of the record. 
No reference, however, is found in those portions of the record, 
or elsewhere, as to the personnel of the two entities. 
3. Paragraph 3 of Mackay's Statement of Facts is entirely 
unsupported by the record cited by Mackay. Mackay refers to pages 
111 and 112 of the record for its assertion that the partnership 
was licensed prior to incorporation of the plaintiff Mackay and 
that financial responsibility and technical qualifications were met 
by the corporation. No such reference is found in the record. In 
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fact, the license of A.J. Mackay & Sons upon which the plaintiff 
corporation relies was issued at a time when no qualifier or 
written examination was required for a contractors license. See 
Certificate of Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing in the Addendum. 
4. Mackay inaccurately states in paragraph 7 of its Statement 
of Facts that when Mackay was licensed in 1985, no special 
qualifications were required and misrepresents that the same 
license bearing the same license number was renewed. No reference 
is found in the record, or elsewhere, to qualifications required 
in 1985 or the license numbers involved. The license obtained by 
the plaintiff corporation in 1985 is license No. 39131-5 in 1985. 
(R. 40). The license of the partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons, is 
license No. 68049. These are two separate licenses bearing 
different license numbers for two independent entities. Okland 
submits herewith, in the Addendum, the certificate of the Utah 
Division of Professional Licensing which clearly states that the 
license of A.J. Mackay & Sons was a different license with a 
different license number. This certificate, although not part of 
the record, is submitted for clarification purposes and to reduce 
any prejudice resulting from Mackay's misstatement of the record. 
5. In paragraph 10 of the Statement of Facts, Mackay alleges 
that it was licensed to perform construction services under the 
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name A.J. Mackay & Sons. In addition to the discussion above, it 
should be noted that A.J. Mackay & Sons, a partnership, is not the 
name or entity which entered into the contracts sued upon and is 
not the plaintiff herein. 
6. Mackay's assertions, in paragraph 14 of the Statement of 
Facts, are not found in the record. Mackay suggests, among other 
things, that Okland and UDOT exercised some level of control over 
the work performed by Mackay. The record cited by Mackay, pages 
49 and 112, contain no such indication that any control was 
exercised over Mackay1s work. 
7. Mackay incorrectly suggests that pages 49, 50, 111, and 
112 of the record indicate that Mackay was solvent, financially 
responsible and posed no risk or danger. No support for these 
assertions appears, however, in the record cited by Mackay or 
elsewhere. 
8. Mackay gives the false impression in paragraph 17 of the 
Statement of Facts, that Okland made arrangements with Mackay in 
subcontracting Mackay1 s work to give a certain "appearance" to UDOT 
without UDOT knowing the true nature of the subcontract. The 
opposite is true. All arrangements made concerning Mackay!s 
subcontracts were made at the direction, request and instance of 
UDOT. Furthermore, such misrepresentations are irrelevant and can 
only be calculated to divert this Court's attention from the issues 
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herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly dismissed Mackay's Complaint on 
several grounds. Primarily, the dismissal was proper due to (1) 
Mackay's failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to 
this action; (2) failure state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted; and (3) failure to comply with the Utah Contractors 
Licensing Act. 
Mackay's Complaint was properly dismissed for failure by 
Mackay to comply with the provisions of the contract sued upon and 
failure to satisfy conditions precedent to this action. The 
contracts required specific notices to be given to Okland within 
specified time limits in the event of any claims by Mackay of the 
nature set forth in the Complaint. The contracts also provided 
that no suit may be brought without compliance with such provision. 
Mackay, however, failed to give any of the required notices. 
Mackay's Complaint was also properly dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and Mackay's failure 
to comply with the Utah Contractors Licensing Act. Utah Code Ann., 
Section 58-50-1, et seq. requires that no contractor may commence 
or maintain an action in this state without both alleging and 
proving that it was properly licensed when the contract sued upon 
was entered into and when the work was performed. The Complaint 
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of Mackay does not allege that Mackay was properly licensed at any 
time. (R. 2) . Furthermore, the Utah State Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing has certified that Mackay was not 
licensed when the contract was entered into or when the work was 
performed. (R. 36,40,98). 
Mackay claims that the Contractors Licensing Act does not 
apply because it contends this is not an action for compensation 
under the contract since Mackay has sought arbitration. Mackay's 
argument, however, is inconsistent with its own statements in its 
Brief that it brought this action for "payment for certain work 
performed" and that it "now seeks compensation for such work". 
(Mackay Brief, pp. 6, 8). Furthermore, Mackayfs Complaint 
specifically states that it is seeking substantial dollar amounts 
from Okland. Mackay's request for arbitration does not diminish 
the fact that Mackay is seeking "payment" and "compensation" for 
work performed without the required license. 
Mackay also contends, for the first time on this appeal, that 
the Utah Contractors Licensing Act is unconstitutional. The 
arguments now raised by Mackay should not be considered on this 
appeal when they were not raised or presented to the District 
Court. Mackay claims that the Licensing Act violates the open 
courts and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution because 
it precludes suits by contractors which fail to comply with the 
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licensing laws. The Licensing Act, however, satisfies all the 
tests of constitutionality set forth by this Court. Furthermore, 
the statute complained of by Mackay only operates to effect Mackay 
as a direct result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the law. 
In any event, Mackay1s constitutional arguments are raised for the 
first time on appeal and are not properly before this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MACKAY HAS FAILED TO SATISFY EXPRESS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
TO BRINGING THE CLAIMS NOW ASSERTED AND ITS CLAIMS HEREIN 
ARE THEREFORE BARRED. 
The Complaint of Mackay was properly dismissed based upon 
Mackay's failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to the 
claims alleged herein. The claims alleged in Mackay1s Complaint 
relate to additions to the agreed work, extras, and the alleged 
impact of Okland!s performance on Mackayfs work on the Project. 
The agreements between Mackay and Okland, however, required Mackay 
to provide to Okland timely written notice as conditions precedent 
to such claims. Mackay has failed to satisfy these conditions 
precedent and, therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the 
Complaint of Mackay. 
The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the following 
provisions relative to Mackay1s claims concerning Okland's 
performance: 
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Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance 
of any work under this contract depend wholly or 
partially upon the proper workmanlike or accurate 
performance of any work or materials furnished by the 
Contractor or other subcontractors on the project, the 
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to 
discover any such defects and report the same in writing 
to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which 
is so dependant; and shall allow to the Contractor a 
reasonable time in which to remedy such defects; and in 
the event he does not so report to the Contractor in 
writing, then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor 
has fully accepted the work of others as being 
satisfactory,.•(Emphasis added). 
Mackay gave no notice, written or otherwise, of any defect in the 
perfonaance of Okland on the project which would impact the work 
of Mackay on the project. (R. 38, 100). Having failed to give the 
required notice, Mackay is precluded from asserting any claim 
relating to alleged deficiencies in the performance of Okland on 
the Project. 
The agreements between Okland and Mackay further provide that 
any changes, additions or extras to the project shall be by written 
amendment to the agreements and claims for extras shall be made 
within one week of performing such extra work. 
...any changes made in the amount of work involved, or 
any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written 
amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes 
involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually 
agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor 
if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not 
possible, then the value of the work shall be determined 
as provided in Section 7 of this agreement. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional 
work outside the scope of this contract unless terms 
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hereof shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement 
between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall 
be made within one week from date of completion. 
Mackay gave no notice of extras within one week of completion 
and no written amendment to the agreements exists with respect to 
the claims asserted by Mackay herein. (R. 38, 100). Mackay has 
not, and cannot, produce such written documentation because no such 
documents exist. The affidavits submitted by Mackay do not allege 
proper or timely notice was given. Mackayfs only support for this 
contention is its attorney's own inadmissible assertion in its 
memorandum to the District Court. Mackay, therefore, is precluded 
from asserting such claims. 
Provisions such as in this case requiring written change 
orders or written notice of extra work claims are enforceable and 
the contractor is not entitled to recover unless the provisions are 
complied with. Anno. 1 ALR3d 1273, 1279; See also Campbell 
Building Company v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 
(1937) ; Owens v. City of Bartlett Labette County, 215 Kan. 840, 528 
P.2d 1235, 1239 (1974); 13 Am.Jur.2d 24, Building, Etc. Contracts, 
Section 122. 
In Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons v. Magna Water, 613 P.2d 1116 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that a similar provision 
"...placed the onus upon the contractor to obtain change orders or 
proceed further at its own risk.11 Id. at 1118. Where Mackay 
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failed to give the required notice of its alleged claims and where 
no written amendment or change order exists, Mackay is precluded 
from asserting its claims for extra work. 
POINT II 
THE COMPLAINT OF MACKAY FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
The Complaint of Mackay was also properly dismissed for 
failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted under Utah law. Utah Code Ann., Section 58-
50-11 (1953 as amended)2, requires that no contractor may commence 
or maintain any action in any Court of the State of Utah for 
collection of compensation for construction services without 
alleging that he was a properly licensed contractor when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that Mackay was a 
licensed contractor in the State of Utah as required by the Utah 
Contractors Licensing Statute and, therefore, should be dismissed. 
Olson v. Reese, 200 P.2d 733 (Utah 1948); B&P Concrete, Inc. v. 
Turnbow, 114 Ariz. 408, 561 P.2d 329 (1977)(holding under 
The current designation of the statute is Section 58-55-
17. See Footnote 1 for the various statutory designations and 
enactments of the statute at issue. 
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substantially identical licensing provision that failure to allege 
license is alone a sufficient basis for dismissal). 
POINT III 
MACKAY'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 
OBTAIN A CONTRACTORS LICENSE AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH 
CONTRACTORS LICENSING ACT. 
The Utah Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 
58-50-1, et seq., requires that any person or entity acting in the 
capacity of a contractor must obtain a contractor's license. 
Mackay's Complaint involves claims for alleged extra work performed 
as a subcontractor on a highway construction project for the State 
of Utah. (R. 2). Mackay, however, was not licensed in the State 
of Utah as a subcontractor at the time the agreements sued upon 
were entered into or when Mackay's alleged claims arose. (R. 
36,40,98). 
Utah Code Ann., Section 58-50-11 (1953 as amended) further 
provides that no person or entity acting in the capacity of a 
contractor without a contractors license may commence or maintain 
any action for payment with respect to work performed as a 
contractor. 
No contractor may act as agent or commence 
or maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
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entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
Mackay alleges in its Complaint that it performed work for 
the improvement and construction upon the subject highway 
construction project. (R. 2). Mackay, however, was not licensed 
as a contractor in the State of Utah when the contract sued upon 
was entered into and when the alleged cause of action arose. (R. 
36, 40, 98). Mackay did not obtain a contractor's license until 
May 31, 1985. (R. 40). The contracts sued upon, however, were 
entered into on February 1, 1984 and all work on the subject 
project was completed by November of 1984. (R. 36, 98). 
A. Mackay, As a Corporation, Was Required Under the Utah 
Contractors Licensing Act to Obtain a Contractors License and 
Cannot Substitute the License of a Partnership. 
Numerous courts have held under similar circumstances that an 
unlicensed contractor such as Mackay in this case, is precluded 
from bringing an action to enfore its construction contracts. 
Mackay, therefore, is barred from maintaining this action and its 
Complaint was properly dismissed by the Court. Mackay contends, 
nevertheless, that the Contractors Licensing Act does not apply to 
3
 Meridian Corp. v McGlynnormaker Company, 567 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977) ; State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 
P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984); Bernard F. Hoste, Inc. v. Kortz, 324 
N.W.2d 46 (Mich.App. 1982); Dunkelberaer v. Baker, 533 P.2d 433 
(Wash.App. 1975); Nickles v. Walker, 395 P.2d 679 (N.M. 1964); 
Northen v. Elledae, 232 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1951). 
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it as a corporate entity because a separate entity, a partnership 
known as A. J. Mackay & Sons, held a license. Mackay's contention 
ignores the fundamental characteristics of a corporation. A. J. 
Mackay & Sons, a partnership, is not the same as A. J. Mackay 
Company, the corporation. Each is a separate and distinct entity 
existing independent of the other. Institutional Laundry, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985). Any common 
ownership or control, if any, does not alter the separateness of 
the two entities. Id. 
The same argument now made by Mackay was rejected in Bernard 
F. Hoste, Inc. v. Kortz, 324 N.W.2d 46 (Mich.App. 1982), under the 
provisions of a nearly identical statute. In that case the 
plaintiff corporation claimed that although it was not licensed, 
it had substantially complied with the licensing act because the 
individual owner of the corporation was licensed. The Court, 
however, rejected this argument. 
In making this argument, plaintiff confuses Bernard F. 
Hoste, Inc. with Bernard Hoste the individual. Although 
Bernard Hoste was a licensed residential builder as an 
individual prior to March 31, 1975, plaintiff was never 
a licensed residential builder prior to March 28, 
1977.... Bernard Hoste and plaintiff cannot be considered 
the same entity for licensing purposes. Therefore, 
plaintiff was not entitled to operate without a license 
during this period. 
Id. at 47 (Emphasis added); See also General Insurance Company v. 
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972). 
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Mackay similarly confuses A.J. Mackay Company, the corporation, 
with A.J. Mackay & Sons, the partnership. These two entities 
"cannot be considered the same entity for licensing purposes". 
Section 107(c), Rules and Regulations of the Utah Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensingf specifically requires that 
a corporation must obtain its own license even where individual 
stockholders may be licensed: 
Creation of a corporation creates a new legal person 
which requires a new license even though one or more 
stockholders have a contractor's license. A license held 
by a stockholder cannot be authority to the corporation 
to engage in contracting. 
Under this regulation, the license asserted by Mackay in the name 
of the A.J. Mackay & Sons partnership cannot be considered the 
license of the corporation A.J. Mackay Company, the corporation. 
Nickles v. Walker, 74 N.M. 546, 395 P.2d 679 (1964)(Decided under 
a similar regulation and statute). Mackay was not properly 
licensed and its action herein, therefore, is precluded by the 
statute. 
It is significant to note that there is no indication in the 
record that a license was held by any stockholder, employee, or 
officer of Mackay. Mackay only claims it was contracting, as a 
corporation, under the license of a partnership. There is no 
indication in the record as to the identity of the individual 
qualifier for the license Mackay subsequently obtained well after 
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the Project was completed. No qualifier at all was required for 
the license held by the partnership A.J. Mackay & Sons. (Addendum). 
It is further well settled that a contractor cannot substitute 
another license for that required by the Contractors Licensing Act. 
In Meridian Corp. v. McGlynnormaker, 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), 
the plaintiff contractor was duly licensed in another state but had 
not been issued a Utah contractor license. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he license in another state cannot be substituted for 
a license in Utah". Id. at 1111. Similarly, Mackay cannot 
substitute the license of a partnership for the license required 
of the plaintiff corporation A.J. Mackay Company. To allow Mackay 
to do so in this case would ignore the mandates of the licensing 
statute and allow Mackay to contract under a partnership's license 
while at the same time enjoying immunity from personal liability 
behind the corporate shield of A.J. Mackay Company. 
In Dunkelbercrer v. Baker, 533 P.2d 433 (Wash.App. 1975), under 
a substantially identical statute, the corporate plaintiff was not 
licensed. The individual owner of the corporation who had operated 
the construction company as a sole proprietor prior to 
incorporating, however, was licensed. The Court, however, held 
that once the corporation began operating, the individual's license 
had "nothing to do with" the case. 
The fact remains that the corporation as a separate 
entity is attempting to prosecute a claim for 
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compensation as a contractor without having taken any 
steps to comply with the registration statute. This, the 
corporation may not do. 
Id. at 437 (Emphasis added); See also General Insurance Company v. 
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972). 
The Court denied recovery to the corporation even though the 
licensed individual claimed personal responsibility for the 
corporation's work. 
B. The Former Exceptions Developed Under the Repealed Licensing 
Act Have No Application to the New Statutory Provisions 
Precluding Suits By Unlicensed Contractors. 
Mackay relies upon Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979), 
Fillmore Products v. Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1977), and other cases for the proposition that certain exceptions 
exist to the mandatory provisions of the Contractor's Licensing 
Act. These cases and the exceptions, however, have no application 
to the present action. These cases and exceptions are not only 
distinguishable factually, but were also decided prior to the 
enactment of the current statutory provision precluding court 
action by unlicensed contractors. 
The cases cited by Mackay were decided under the old licensing 
act, U.C.A., Section 58-23-1, repealed in 1981, which did not 
contain the current provision precluding civil actions without a 
proper license. Loader v. Scott Const. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229 
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(Utah 1984). Since the former licensing act did not provide a 
consequence in civil litigation for failure to obtain a license, 
the Utah courts judicially adopted a general rule precluding 
unlicensed contractors from recovering for contracting work. Id. 
at 1229. The Loader decision recognized the distinction between 
the former common law developed under the repealed act and the new 
statutory scheme and that the status of the law under the current 
statutory provsion is not the same as the former the common law. 
Id. at 1229. The former judicial exceptions, therefore, have no 
application to the current legislative mandate of Section 58-50-
11. 
Mackay contends that the legislature intended no change in the 
law when it repealed the old statute and enacted the current 
licensing provisions. It is well settled, however, that when the 
legislature enacts or changes a statute as it did in this case, it 
is presumed that the legislature intended a change in the existing 
law. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988); 
Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987); Cantwell v. Geiqer, 
742 P.2d 468 (Mont. 1987); McLeod v. Chilton. 643 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 
1981). 
There is a strong presumption that legislatures do not 
create statutes containing provisions which are 
redundant, void, inert and trivial. Furthermore, it is 
presumed when a legislature alters the language of a 
statute that it intended to create a change in the 
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existing law. 
State v. Kozlowski, 692 P.2d 316, 317 (Ariz.App. 1984). The Utah 
Legislature enacted Section 58-50-11 without enacting any provision 
for exceptions. It is presumed, therefore, that the legislature 
intended to eliminate the exceptions under the repealed statute. 
Mackay contends that the former common law exceptions should 
be read into the new statute. Section 58-50-11, however, is clear 
and unambiguous and must be read and enforced according to the 
plain meaning of its provisions without regard to the previous 
common law. Epstein v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of State of 
Wash., 731 P.2d 17 (Wash.App. 1987). If the legislature intended 
to create any exceptions, or to recognize the former exceptions 
under the repealed statute, it could have easily added them to the 
statute. 
It is clear that the legislature failed to enact a 
provision providing exceptions to the rule. Previous 
common law rules, whatever they were, cannot create 
exceptions to a clear statute. 
State v. Arce, 730 P.2d 1260, 1262 n.3 (Or.App. 1986). Such 
exceptions to the clear and unambiguous language and meaning of the 
statute are matters for the legislature to determine and not for 
the courts. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 
(1967); Duckworth v. Cameron, 244 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. 1978)(Statute 
precluding suit by unlicensed contractor was clear and unambiguous 
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and must be applied literally). 
Mackay nevertheless cites Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. 
v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that the 
judicial exceptions previously applied to the judicial rule barring 
actions by unlicensed contractors still apply to the new statutory 
mandate. The Wilderness Court, however, did not go this far. The 
sole issue in that case was "whether any evidence supports the 
claims of the party against whom the verdict was rendered....11 
Although the Wilderness decision refers to the exceptions to the 
judicial rule against recovery by unlicensed contractors, such 
reference was made strictly with respect to whether there was any 
evidence in the record to support the directed verdict in that 
case. The parties did not raise, and the Court did not address, 
the issue in this case as to whether the former judicial exceptions 
have any application to current Contractors Licensing Act. 
Mackay contends that since the Court referred to the 
exceptions without expressly rejecting their application under the 
new statute, the Court has implicitly acknowledged the continued 
effect of such exceptions. Such implication is misconceived, 
however, because to address such issue when it was not raised by 
the parties and not presented to the Court would violate the policy 
of the Court not to render advisory or academic opinions. Redwood 
Gym v. Salt Lake Ctv. Com'n, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981). 
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Where the legislature has enacted a clear mandate precluding, 
without exception, suits by contractors that are not properly 
licensed, the former judicial exceptions to the old rule can have 
no application. Epstein v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of State 
of Wash., 731 P.2d 17 (Wash.App. 1987). It is well settled that 
the Court's "...will not judicially create an exception to the 
plain statutory wording." State v. Ring, 641 P.2d 862, 866 
(Arizona 1982). It has similarly been stated that: 
...Courts are not free to construe unambiguous 
legislation; they may not read language into a statute 
that has not been there, particularly if it makes sense 
as written. 
Hansman v. Bernadillo Cty. Assessor, 625 P.2d 1214, 1217 (New 
Mexico 1980); See also Grand River Dam Auth. v. State, 645 P.2d 
1011 (Okla. 1982); Olando v. Prewett, 705 P.2d 593 (Mont. 1985). 
In Northen v. Elledge, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951), the 
Court denied an action by an unlicensed contractor under a similar 
statute and refused to create equitable exceptions such as those 
urged by Mackay. 
The public policy involved here has been determined 
by the legislature; it is not a subject of debate in the 
courts. 
It may be argued that the court should exercise its 
equitable discretion and permit the plaintiff recovery 
even in the face of a specific prohibition in the statute 
on the ground that an unreasonable forfeiture would 
result. However, the statute requiring a contractor to 
possess a contractor's license before he may recover for 
work done was designed for the protection of the public 
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and must not be defeated in order to accommodate one who 
has violated the provisions of the statute. Permitting 
an unlicensed contractor to recover on the ground that 
a loss would result to him otherwise would completely 
nullify the statute since every unlicensed contractor 
would sustain a loss or forfeiture unless he were allowed 
recovery. The remedy, if any, lies with the legislature. 
In State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d 
1148 (Alaska 1984), the Court denied recovery by an unlicensed 
contractor under a provision practically identical to Section 58-
50-11. 
Public policy precludes giving this statute anything 
but a literal reading. 
The legislature chose the closing of the doors of 
the courts as a fundamental tool to enforce its policy 
of ensuring competence and financial responsibility in 
those who undertake work as contractors. We are bound 
to enforce the legislative policies as we find them 
expressed in [the licensing statute]. Anyone engaged in 
building trades must be charged with awareness of the 
pervasive system of licenses and permits designed to 
enhance the public safety and confidence in the industry. 
Engrafting equitable exemptions onto the enforcement 
policy at best aids the ignorant and gullible, whom the 
legislature sought to regulate, and at worst creates 
fertile fields for sharp practice. 
Id. at 1157 (Emphasis in original) 
The Tyonek Court also cited General Insurance Company v. 
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972), in 
which case the Court stated: 
[The statute] represents a legislative determination that 
the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from 
engaging in the contracting business outweighs any 
harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence 
can best be realized by denying violators the right to 
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maintain any action for compensation in the courts of the 
state. 
In the case at bench plaintiff corporation was not 
licensed at the time it executed the contract nor at any 
time during its performance. Under these circumstances, 
to disregard its corporate existence would nullify that 
part of the licensing law requiring a separate license 
for a corporation, and to hold that plaintiff has 
nevertheless substantially complied with [the statute] 
requiring that it be duly licensed at all times during 
the performance, would emasculate the statutory language 
and nullify the section's purpose of pragmatically 
enforcing the contractor's license law. 
Id. at 546-47. 
This Court has similarly held that statutes should be 
interpreted and enforced according to their plain meaning. 
We have also said that a statute should be applied 
according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume that 
each term in the statute was used advisedly by the 
Legislature and that each should be interpreted and 
applied according to its usually accepted meaning. Where 
the ordinary meaning of the terms results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express 
purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of this Court 
to assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme. 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
Additionally, the application of the exceptions asserted by 
Mackay would clearly have a result not intended by the legislature. 
Mackay contends that the statute does not apply because Mackay 
subcontracted with Okland, a licensed contractor, on a project 
owned by UDOT and that the statute does not protect Okland and 
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UDOT. In effect, Mackay contends that contractors can ignore the 
mandatory licensing requirements of the Contractors Licensing Act 
so long as the unlicensed contractor deals with licensed 
contractors and government entities. Mackayfs approach would open 
the floodgates of unlicensed subcontractors performing construction 
work because the enforcement provision of the Licensing Act would 
be rendered ineffective. State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber, 
Inc. , 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984); General Insurance Company v. 
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972); 
Northen v. Elledae, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951). 
The Utah Legislature, by enacting Section 58-50-11, has 
established a means of enforcing the licensing requirements by 
precluding actions by contractors that are not duly and properly 
licensed. Without a legislative enactment creating exceptions to 
this rule, the former judicial exceptions relied upon by Mackay 
have no application to this case. Furthermore, even if the 
exceptions relied upon by Mackay still exist under the current 
statute, the record is devoid of any indication that facts or 
circumstances exist which would give rise to the application of 
such exceptions. Mackay's Complaint, therefore, was properly 
dismissed where Mackay was not licensed when the contract sued upon 
was entered into and when its claims arose. 
31 
POINT IV 
MACKAY'S COMPLAINT HEREIN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 58-50-11 
AS AN ACTION FOR COMPENSATION AND PAYMENT FOR WORK FOR 
WHICH A CONTRACTORS LICENSE IS REQUIRED. 
Mackay contends that its action herein is not one for 
compensation for contracting work under Section 58-50-11 because 
Mackay has requested the District Court to order arbitration of its 
claims. This argument unrealistically ignores the nature of 
Mackay's Complaint and contradicts Mackay's own characterization 
of this action. The Complaint sets forth various alleged claims 
for which Mackay seeks to recover for alleged work as a 
subcontractor on a public highway construction project. 
Furthermore, Mackay states in its Brief that it initiated this 
action "for payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff" and 
that it "now seeks compensation" for such work. (Mackay's Brief, 
pp. 6, 8). 
In Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif. 
1949), the Court rejected the argument now presented by Mackay 
under a similar statute. The Court held: 
. . .application for confirmation of the arbitrator's award 
and entry of the "judgment" in conformity therewith was 
an "action...for collection of compensation" within the 
purport of [the licensing statute]. 
Id. at 40. The fact that Mackay has sought arbitration does not 
diminish the fact that Mackay is seeking compensation in this 
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matter. Id. at 40. The arbitration and award of compensation 
sought by Mackay, requires an "action" in the courts under the Utah 
Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-31a-l, et seq. (1985) . 
Without a proper contractors license, however, Mackay is precluded 
from maintaining such action. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD NOT 
BE DISTURBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS ASSERTED 
BY MACKAY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The dismissal of Mackay's Complaint should not be disturbed 
under the constitutional arguments now presented by Mackay for the 
first time on appeal. Such arguments are not properly raised at 
this time and should not be considered. Furthermore, the 
Contractors Licensing Act does not violate any constitutional 
provisions under the standards set by this Court. Finally, any 
detriment complained of by Mackay under the statute is the direct 
result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the licensing law for 
a period of over six years. Mackay cannot complain of any result 
or operation of statute that occurs solely because of its own 
failure to comply with the law. 
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A. Mackayfs Argument that the Contractors Licensing Act is 
Unconstitutional is Raised for the First Time on this Appeal 
and is Inappropriate for Review by this Court, 
Mackay contends, for the first time in its Brief on appeal, 
that the Contractor's Licensing Act which it failed to comply with 
violates the due process provisions of the United States and Utah 
State Constitutions and the open courts provisions of the Utah 
State Constitution. Mackay has not raised or argued these issues 
at any time prior to this appeal. (R. 60-79,114-134). This issue, 
therefore, "is not properly before this Court since it may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal". Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 
758, 761 (Utah 1988); See Also Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
In Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984), 
this Court Stated: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and 
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
Id. at 758. (Quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 
301, 303, 470 P.2d 399 (1970)). Mackay did not present to the 
District Court any of the constitutional theories or arguments now 
asserted to circumvent the clear and unambiguous provisions of the 
Contractors Licensing Statute. These issues are raised for the 
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first time on this appeal and are not properly before the Court. 
B. The Utah Contractors Licensing Act Does Not Violate Mackayfs 
Rights of Due Process or Access to the Courts, 
Mackay suggests in its Brief that its rights of due process 
and the open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution are 
violated by the operation of the Contractors Licensing Act 
precluding suits by contractors which are not properly licensed. 
Mackay further contends that its rights are somehow violated by 
"state action". The operation of the statute in this case, 
however, does not result from any action by the state or any other 
entity other than Mackay itself. The sole cause of the statutes's 
operation here is Mackay's own failure to obtain the required 
contractors license prior to entering into the subject construction 
contract. 
The legislature has broad authority in enacting statutes for 
the general welfare of the community. 
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police 
power, a state can enact regulations or laws reasonably 
necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort 
or general welfare of the community regardless of whether 
such laws or regulations affect contracts incidentally, 
directly or indirectly. 
George v. Qren Ltd. & Associates. 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983). 
Mackay contends that the statute cannot operate 
constitutionally without the exceptions asserted by Mackay. If 
Mackay's exceptions are read into the statute, the statute will 
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have no operation or effect at all. Contractors will be left free 
to ignore the licensing requirements and sue on their contracts so 
long as they deal with other contractors or government entities. 
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989), the Court set forth the two-part test for due process 
analysis and applied this test under the open courts provision of 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. If the legislature abrogates 
one remedy, it must create another. 
The benefit provided by the substitute must be 
substantially equal in value or other benefit 
to the remedy abrogated in providing 
essentially comparable substantive protection 
to one's person, property, or reputation, 
although the form of the substitute remedy may 
be different. 
Second, if the legislature fails to provide a 
substitute or alternative remedy: 
abrogation of the remedy or cause of action 
may be justified only if there is a clear 
social or economic evil to be eliminated and 
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. 
Id. at 357-58; See also, Sun Valley Water Beds v. Herm Hughes & 
Son, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (September 29, 1989). The 
Condemarin Court stated that the same test applies under both the 
due process and open courts provisions of the constitution. 
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Mackay's argument mistakenly presupposes that the statute has 
"abrogated" or taken away its cause of action. The statute, 
however, does not "abrogate" Mackay's remedy, but only requires 
Mackay to comply with the law as a condition precedent to bringing 
an action in court. The Act only effects actions by contractors 
who fail to comply with the Act and contract illegally. As pointed 
out above, any loss of remedy, is caused solely by Mackay's own 
failure to comply with the Contractors Licensing Statute. In any 
event, the first prong of the open courts test is satisfied because 
the Contractors Licensing Act does afford Mackay an alternative 
remedy. The alternative provided is simply to comply with the 
Act's licensing requirements. The right of access to the courts 
is in no way impaired for contractors who comply with the law. 
Assuming arguendo, that the first test is not met, the second 
part of the test is satisfied. The statute is aimed at the purpose 
of regulating contractors and protecting the.public from inept and 
financially irresponsible contractors. Furthermore, the means of 
enforcing the licensing requirement is not arbitrary or 
unreasonable because all the contractor needs to do to bring an 
action in the courts is to properly comply with the licensing 
requirements. Mackay has not made any showing to the contrary. 
It cannot rationally be said that a statute which does nothing more 
than require compliance with the law is arbitrary or unreasonable. 
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The fact that the statute does not affect a contractor's right 
to bring or maintain an action in the courts unless the contractor 
fails to be properly licensed and contracts illegally, is of 
additional significance to the constitutional analysis. Mackay 
cannot complain of the operation of the statute when it only 
operates as a result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the 
law. Since the Act only affects the contractor's rights when he 
fails to comply with the licensing requirements of the Act, the 
analysis should not be on the provision precluding court action but 
rather on the licensing requirements themselves. It is the 
licensing requirements which, when not complied with, trigger the 
provisions precluding suits by illegal contractors. Mackay has not 
suggested, however, that the licensing requirements are 
unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Mackay fs Complaint was properly dismissed where Mackay did not 
satisfy the express conditions precedent to bringing its action. 
The contracts required specific notices to be given to Okland 
within specified time limits in the event of any claims by Mackay 
of the nature set forth in the Complaint. The contracts also 
provided that no suit may be brought without compliance with such 
provisions. Mackay, however, failed to give any of the required 
notices. 
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The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that Mackay had a 
license at any time and, therefore, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, Mackay's action herein was also 
properly dismissed due to the fact that Mackay was not licensed 
when the contract sued upon was entered into and performed as 
required by the Utah Contractors Licensing Act. 
The Contractors Licensing Act fully applies to Mackayfs action 
herein for payment and compensation for work allegedly performed 
as an unlicensed contractor. 
Mackay's constitutional arguments are raised for the first 
time on appeal and are not properly considered on this appeal. 
Furthermore, the Utah Contractors Licensing Act does not violate 
any provision of the Utah or Federal constitutions. Mackay has no 
standing to complain of the operation of the Licensing Act when 
such operation is only triggered by Mackay's own failure to comply 
with the Licensing Act. The Licensing Act meets all tests of 
constitutionality. 
Dated this day of March, 1990. 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to be mailed, United States Mail, first class, postage 
prepaid, to the following this day of March, 1990: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
f4n\r JFPT4k 
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ADDENDUM 
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, : 
INC. , 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
: Civil No. 
Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendant, alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation authorized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah having its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a corporation authorized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah and being located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement for 
construction services as part of the Utah Department of 
Transportation Project No. 1-215-9(72)10, West of Little 
Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East. 
4. Pursuant to said agreement, Defendant agreed to pay the 
sum of approximately $730,000. plus or minus the reasonable value 
of any work added to or deleted from the project. 
5. Plaintiff has duly performed all of the terms and 
conditions required of it under said agreement. 
6. Defendant has failed to perform pursuant to the said 
agreement and has breached the same by: 
(a) failing to pay a sum exceeding $240,000. which is due 
and owing Plaintiff by Defendant after all changes and 
credits have been added and deducted together with interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum; 
(b) causing Plaintiff damages for loss of efficiency in an 
amount exceeding $240,000. by using improper contract 
management procedures; 
(c) causing damage to Plaintiff in an amount to be 
determined at the hearing of this matter by failing to 
properly perform its duties and responsibilities as the prime 
contractor on the project; 
(d) causing damage to Plaintiff in an amount to be 
determined at the hearing of this matter by wrongfully 
requiring extra work and duties of the Plaintiff; 
(e) causing Plaintiff a loss of overhead and profit in an 
amount to be determined at the hearing of this matte as a 
result of the aforesaid breaches of the agreement. 
7. Section 7 of the agreements entitled Disputes, provides 
that any dispute concerning matters in connection with these 
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agreements, and without the scope of the work, then such dispute 
shall be settled by a ruling board of arbitration. 
8. Demand for arbitration was made upon Defendant on or 
about December 27, 1987, in writing. Defendant has failed and 
refused to enter into arbitration as required by the terms and 
conditions of the agreement. 
9. By reason of the failure and refusal of Defendant to 
render payment of the sums due Plaintiff, and to enter into 
arbitration under the terms and conditions of the Contract, it has 
been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure services of an attorney 
to represent it in this action. Defendant should be required to 
pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
1. For an order that the Defendant be required to submit 
the matter to arbitration in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract and the Utah Arbitration Act. 
2. For Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in this matter, 
3. For Plaintiff's costs of Court and such other and 
further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises. 
DATED this 2f day of December, 1988. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
BV: e^+MJuJ? 
Robert F. Babcock 
Plaintiff's Address: 
350 West Hartwell Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
10-3-ajmacoak.cpl 
-3-
DISTRICT COURT COVER SHEET 
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY 
DEFENDANTS 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC, 
(b) ATTORNEYS (Attorney name, 
Bar I. Address & Telephone #) 
Robert F. Babcock #0158 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 531-7000 
ATTORNEY (If known) 
II. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in 
DOMESTIC 
DA Divorce/Annulment 
SM Separate Maintenance 
PA Paternity 
SA Spouse Abuse 
UR URESA Action 
PROBATE 
ES Estate 
GC Guardian/Conservator 
NC Name Change 
OT Other Probate 
appropriate category) 
CIVIL 
AA Administrative Agency 
AP Appeal 
CV Other Civil 
X X X
 CN Contract 
CS Custody and Support 
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus 
PD Property Damage 
PI Personal Injury 
PR Property Rights (Real) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
MI Miscellaneous 
ABSTRACTS 
AJ Abstract of Judgment 
TL Tax Lien 
MENTAL HEALTH 
MH Mental Health 
ADOPTIONS 
AD Adoption 
III. JURY DEMAND: 
( ) YES <XJ* N 0 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
STANFORD P. FITTS 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
3 00 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : RICHARD T. LINDBERG 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., : Civil No. C88-8250 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, Richard T. Lindberg, having been duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay 
Company ("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract 
agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah 
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West 
of Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 13 00 East. The work on 
this project was completed in November of 1984. 
2. On or about December 28, 1988, Mackay served upon 
Okland its Complaint seeking arbitration of claims for payment 
for certain work allegedly performed by Plaintiff under the above 
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agreements. 
3. All damages claimed by Mackay, if any, against Okland 
result from acts of the Utah State Department of Transportation 
("UDOT"), and not of Okland, and all such claims pass through to 
UDOT and would be the subject of third-party claims by Okland 
against UDOT. 
4. The agreement between UDOT and Okland for construction 
of the above referenced project does not provide for resolution 
of disputes by arbitration. 
5. The granting of arbitration for resolving the issues and 
claims of plaintiff Mackay would result in duplicate proceedings 
and multiplicity of lawsuits between Mackay, Okland and UDOT. 
6. UDOT has indicated to Okland that it will not 
participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims. 
7. Mackay has submitted its claims on the subject 
construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a 
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT 
concerning such claims. 
8. The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland are 
without resolution pending documentation from Mackay to resolve 
UDOT concerns regarding Mackay's claims, including primarily 
concerns that Mackay1s claims are the result of not adequately 
managing its work forces. 
9. Mackay has not provided any response or documentation 
regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland concerning Mackay1s 
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claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four 
years, 
10. UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated 
damages on the subject project due to failure of Mackay to timely 
complete its work, Okland has not withheld any amounts from 
Mackay under its agreements on the project, 
11. Okland has sought, over the past four years, the 
cooperation of Mackay in pursuing their claims against UDOT, 
including information relating to UDOT concerns that Mackay 
failed to adequately man its work forces, but Mackay has not 
provided such cooperation or information. 
12. Mackay has not provided any written notice of alleged 
deficiencies in Okland's work impacting the work of Mackay and 
has given no written notice of additional or extra work within 
one week of completion of the work. No written addendum to the 
agregaaajjts exist relative to the claims of Mackay. 
1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at:__ 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this j^fe day of 
January, 1989: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
William E.Dunn Heber M. Wells Build.ng 
Executive Director 1 6 0 E a s t 3 0 0 South/P.O. Box 45802 
David E. Robinson S a , t L a k e c, tY- u t a h 84145-0802 
Division Dirmnr 801 -530-6628 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
THIS IS 10 CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained 
by i he U t ah SI a t e D i. \/ i -> i on o f Occupa t i ona 1 and P rof e s s i. ona 1 L i cens ing , 
repeals whether- an official contractors license has ewer been issued to: 
A. J. Mack ay Company, a corporation, and whether such license, if any, is 
c ur r cn t o r ha s e x p i red . 
It is hereby certified that license no. 39131--S was issued by this office 
for said licensee on May 31, 1985 with the classifications 1100 General 
£ ncj j n e e r i r ig a r id 3 0 3 0 D e mo 1 i. 11 o n & 1A) r e c k i ng . S a id 1 i c e n s e is current. 
t FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by 
virtue of Title 58 U . C . H . 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper 
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere 
they would be in my control and possession. 
This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in 
compliance with RULE '14(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ii\i WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 29th. day of 
December, 198 8. 
George P. Wei ler, License Coord ihUTHTr 
OJtah State Division of Occupational 
and Profess ional Licens ing 
EXHIBIT'S" 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
STANFORD P. FITTS 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
300 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 53 8-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : R. BEN NILSEN 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., : Civil No. C88-8250 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, R. Ben Nilsen, having been duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I was the project manager for Okland Construction 
Company, Inc. ("Okland") on the Utah Department of Transportation 
project number 1-215-9(72)10, West of Little Cottonwood Creek to 
West of 1300 East. The work on this project was completed in 
November of 1984. I have personal knowledge of the matters 
stated herein. 
2. Richard T. Lindberg is the Secretary/Treasurer of Okland 
Construction Company. 
3. On or about February 1, 1984 A. J. Mackay Company 
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("Mackay") entered into subcontract agreements with Okland for 
work on the project. 
4. Mackay has not presented any claims to Okland other than 
claims which Mackay claimed result from acts of the Utah State 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), and not of Okland, and 
which Mackay presented to be passed through to UDOT. 
5. If Okland is forced to arbitrate Mackay's claims and an 
arbitration award is made against Okland, Okland will then file a 
lawsuit against UDOT to recover the amounts awarded to Mackay in 
the arbitration. 
6. UDOT has indicated to Okland that it will not 
participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims. 
7. Mackay has submitted its claims on the subject 
construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a 
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT 
concerning such claims. 
8. The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland have 
not been finished because Okland and UDOT are waiting for 
documentation and responses regarding UDOT concerns regarding 
Mackay's claims, including primarily concerns that Mackay's 
claims are the result of not adequately manning and equiping its 
work forces. 
9. Mackay has not provided any response or documentation 
regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland concerning Mackay's 
claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four 
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years. 
10. UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated 
damages on the UDOT project due to failure of Mackay to timely 
complete its work. Okland has not withheld any amounts from 
Mackay under its agreements on the project. 
11. Okland has sought, over the past four years, the 
cooperation of Mackay in pursuing Mackay's claims against UDOT, 
including information relating to UDOT concerns that Mackay 
failed to adequately man its work forces, but Mackay has not 
provided such cooperation or information. 
12. Mackay has not provided any written notice of claimed 
deficiencies in Okland's work affecting Mackay's work and has 
given no written notice of additional or extra work within one 
week of completion of the claimed extra work. No written 
addendum to the agreements exist relative to the claims of 
Mackay. 
13. The water problems which Mackay claims delayed the 
project were the result of site conditions differing from the 
plans and specifications prepared by UDOT. Mackay admits that 
the State of Utah should pay for these claims concerning excess 
water on the job. 
14. Okland has fully satisfied and completed all its 
obligations to Mackay under the subject agreements and has paid 
to Mackay all retention funds and amounts due thereunder. 
16. Okland did not intend that the arbitration language in 
3 
the subject agreements would apply to claims presented to Okland 
to be passed through to UDOT. 
17. Mackay did not notify Okland of any claims not passing 
through to the State of Utah until the initiation of this 
lawsuit. 
18. All claims presented to Okland by Mackay prior to the 
initiation of this lawsuit were claims which Mackay presented to 
Okland so Okland could pass them through to UDOT and which Mackay 
claimed should be paid by the State of Utah. The attached letter 
was received from Mackay regarding its claims on the project. 
19. The discussions between Mackay, Okland and UDOT have 
been sporadic because Mackay's has not provided any documentation 
or response to UDOT or Okland regarding UDOT's concern that 
Mackay failed to adequately man his work. UDOT's daily 
engineer's reports indicate that Mackay failed to provide 
sufficient personnel on the job to prosecute its work. Mackay 
has not given any explanation for these records. 
20. UDOT has expressed a concern that Mackay's truck 
drivers where not working in an efficient manner. Reports 
indicated that Mackay's trucks were leaving the project in a 
direction other than toward the designated dump site. Duane 
Christensen, UDOT engineer reported to Okland that he followed 
one Mackay truck leaving the job-site at approximately 6400 
South, that the truck drove up to the avenues, stopped at an 
apartment and returned two hours later to the job-site with the 
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same load it left with. 
R. Ben Nilsen 
Lis / S ^ * Subscribed and sworn to before me thi day of 
February, 1989. 
My Commission Expires:
 v I 1 - •! VI^^FT I > A 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this /,^*-day of 
February, 1989: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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A. J. MftCKftY COMPANY 
3435 WEST 900 SOUTH 
SftLT LAKE CITY, UTAH 93104 
November 13, 1984 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION 
Post Office Box 15448 
1978 South West Temple 
Salt Lake Ctty, UT 84115 
Attention: Ben Nilsen 
RE: 1-215-3(72)10 
Dear Ben: 
I have pat together a list of items that I feel should be 
paid for by the State of Utah. Before getting to the 
specific items, I would like to outline a few guidelines 
which pertain to the assessment of the various costs. 
Whenever possible, an extra will be related to an existing 
item in the original contract and the rate for that item 
will be used, e.g. item A. under the section for excess 
water pertains to the mass excavation which has a rate of 
$3.00/ cubic yard. Otherwise, the cost will be figured 
according to the U.D.0.T guidelines which allow: 
A. With respect to labor costs, the actual per hour 
cost will have an additional 30* factor to cover 
administrative overhead, taxes, and benefits. According to 
this formula, an excavator operator should be figured at 
$38.59/hour, a 1©—wheel dump truck driver at $25.53/hour, a 
semi end—dump driver at $25-73/hour, and a general laborer 
at $18.02/hour. 
B. With respect to materials costs, the actual cost 
will have an additional 15% factor to cover administrative 
overhead. 
C. With respect to equipment costs, the rates are 
outlined in an equipment rental blue book which allows 
$129.15 for a 235 excavator, $77.95 for a 225 excavator, 
$46.63 for a 10—wheel dump truck, and $65.48 for a semi end-
dump truck. 
With these guidelines understood, the following items are 
directly related to the problem of excess water on the site. 
A. There was 25% extra production required on 87,590 
cubic yards of supei—saturated material. This converts to 
21,898 cubic yards <? $3. 00/cu. yd. , or $65,692.96, 
B- Routing the water in the bottom of the excavation 
project required 105 hours of 235 excavator with operator (? 
$159.74/hour, or $16,772.70. 
C. Regrading the slopes and bottom of the excavation 
project due to excess water required 60 hours of 235 
excavator with operator (? $159.74/hour, or $9,584.40. 
D. Road construction as follows: 1583 cubic yards 
hauled into the site and then left to be used by W. W. Clyde 
after we left the project; and 458 cubic yards hauled into 
the site and then hauled out. At the rate of $3.00/cubic 
yard, the cost figures to 1583 cubic yards i? $3.00 and 458 
cubic yards £ $6.00, or $7,497.00. 
E. When the 12" wire baskets were placed under the 
flume, the wet condition of the slopes necessitated the use 
of extra cobble rock at the toe of the slopes to keep the 
baskets in place. 122 cubic yards were used at a cost of 
$9.11/cubic yard, or $1,111.42. In addition, this operation 
required 12 hours of 10—wheel dump truck and driver <? 
$72.16/hour, or $865.92, and 4 hours of 235 excavator with 
operator & $159.74/hour, or $638.96. The total cost for 
this item is $2616.30. 
F. When the ditches were dug for the drainage pipe, 
the excess water from the banks necessitated an over-
excavation of the 12" and 66" ditches. The 12" excavation 
amounted to 464 cubic yards and the 66" excavation amounted 
to 624 cubic yards. With an allowance of $3.00 for the 
excavation and $8.00 for the additional material needed for 
backfill, this item amounts to $11,968.00. 
In addition to the extras due to excess uater conditions, 
there 3L^G also extra items with respect to the excavation. 
ft. Concerning the E and F ramps, even though the 
excavation of these ramps is accounted for in the cross-
sectioning of the mass excavation, we were directed by 
U.D.0.T. officials to extend our grading of these ramps 
beyond the mass excavation boundaries to facilitate the 
laying of forthcoming pipe. This involved 2664 cubic yards 
& $3. 00/cu. yd. , or $7,992.00. 
B. The hauling of the weigh slab consisted of 152 
cubic yards which required 28.5 hours of 10-wheel dump truck 
eartd driver <? $72. 16 and dump fees for 19 loads <? 
$20-00/load. These two factors total $2436.56. 
C. The hauling of flood control concrete consisted of 
240 cubic yards which required 45 hours of 10-wheel dump 
truck and driver (? $72. 16 and dump fees for 30 loads <? 
$20-00/load. These two factors total $3847.20. 
D. The hauling of concrete to the Magna Landfill due 
to its refusal at the Golf Course required 25 hours of semi 
end-dump truck and driver <? $91.21/hr and dump fees for 25 
loads <? $20.00/load. These two factors total $2780.25. 
E. We had to increase our haul route due to the 
elimination of the culvert on 6400 South and the extra 
hauling time amounted to 33% over 7406 cubic yards of 
material. This translates to $1.00 extra per cubic yard, or 
$7, 406. 00. 
Lastly, there are several items which should be addressed in 
the an^^ai of the Gabian Baskets aspect of the project. 
A. With respect to the creek banks, we believe an 
ovei—excavation occurred when the creek was widened beyond 
the amount specified to place the gabian baskets. This 
amounted to 3111 cubic yards (? $3.00/cu.yd., or $3,333.00. 
B. With respect to the creek bed, an ovei—excavation 
of 1111 cubic yards occurred when we had to deepen the creek 
bed to accomodate the grade specified for the loose riprap. 
This amounts to $3,333.00. 
C. Concerning the "public relations" work we did to 
appease the various homeowners whose property borders the 
creek, 40 hours of 225 excavator and operator were required 
@ $108.54/hour as well as 80 hours of general labor 9 
$18-02/hour. These two items total $5783.20. 
We have tried to be as comprehensive and responsible as 
possible in our preparation of these figures. Don't 
hesitate to contact us if we can be of any further 
assistance. 
Sincerely, 
John Henry McCaughey 
A. J. MACKPY CO. 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
STANFORD P. FITTS 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
3 00 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., : Civil No. C88-8250 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. : 
Defendant Okland Construction Company, Inc's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 
Counterclaims came on regularly for hearing before the above 
entitled Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, on March 
13, 1989. Defendant was represented by counsel of record, Wilford 
A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. Plaintiff was 
represented by counsel of record Robert F. Babcock, Esq. The Court 
having reviewed the memoranda submitted and heard the arguments of 
counsel for the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
Third JiiOicsn i..\oinct 
MAR 2 9 1989 
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HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to Compel 
Arbitration and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 
Counterclaims are denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted 
and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff is precluded 
from maintaining its action by the provisions of the Utah 
Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 58-50-1, et 
seq. 
Dated this ^tf day of March, 1989. 
BY THE-SCOURT 
Jamesr^  s. Sawav^/ 
"District Court: Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this ^ 3 day of 
March, 1989: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- s l . |> JR=*sr4U 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
I Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L. Buhler 
Executive Director 
David E. Robinson 
Division Director 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802 
(801)530-6628 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained 
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
reveals whether an official contractors license has ever been issued to: 
A. J. MACKAY & SONS, and whether such license, if any, is current or has 
expired. 
It is hereby certified that license no. 68049 was issued by this office 
for said licensee on October 11, 1959 as a partnership with the 
classifications Al General Engineering and C34 Wrecking and Demolition. At 
the time of issue, no qualifier or any written examinations were required to 
obtain a contractors license. Said license lapsed April 30. 1985. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by 
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper 
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere 
they would be in my control and possession. 
This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in 
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 20th. day of 
February, 1990. 
S E A L George P. Weiler, License Coordinator 
UtsiK State Division of Occupational 
aoa Professional Licensing 
